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ARE SECURITIES LAWS EFFECTIVE AGAINST
CLIMATE CHANGE? A PROPOSAL FOR
TARGETED CLIMATE RELATED DISCLOSURE
AND GHG REDUCTION
By Nate Chumley*
ABSTRACT
The New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil
on October 24, 2018, claiming the company committed securities
fraud in order to prop up the value of the company by publicly
disclosing a higher proxy cost—or projected future cost—of climate
change regulation than the internal cost used. Following this lawsuit,
a federal class action was filed utilizing the same legal theory on the
same facts. These lawsuits should be viewed as part of the larger
history of lawsuits against large fossil fuel companies for climate
change-related harms. Public nuisance theory largely captured a set of
lawsuits against these companies, before being nullified as an
actionable federal claim by AEP and Kivalina on displacement
grounds.
There are several issues with using securities fraud to address climate
change. First, securities laws suffer from circularity, as harmed
investors are recouped by other stakeholders and the corporation,
thereby also harming the shareholder group, and leaving no net gain.
Second, quantifying proxy costs poses a challenge, as future
regulations are not yet in existence. Third, climate change disclosure
is not mandated by the SEC, which leads to a range of disclosure, often
inadequate, from the use of varied accounting frameworks or the lack
of disclosure entirely. Finally, securities law fails to address the
societal cost of climate change, instead focusing on reimbursing the
internal harmed shareholder group while excluding externally harmed
groups. This Note proposes a legislative solution through comparison
to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 as a societalfocused law. Through the proposed legislation, this Note seeks to help
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refine securities fraud as a tool to combat climate change-related
financial fraud to capture negative externalities.
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INTRODUCTION
The effects of climate change continue to worsen as the global rise
in temperature approaches 1.5 degrees Celsius.1 The frequency and
intensity of hurricanes, wild fires, droughts, heat waves, and other
extreme weather events are increasing, while glacier melt and sea level
rise continue unabated.2 Climate change has conclusively been attributed
to anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 Recently, the
Climate Accountability Institute reported that if fossil fuels continue to
be extracted at the same rate over the next twenty-eight years as they were
between 1988 and 2017, “global average temperatures would be on course
to rise by 4 degrees Celsius . . . by the end of the century.”4 This
temperature rise has dire consequences, including extensive “species
extinction . . . and global food scarcity”5 risks. The report further
calculated that one hundred companies are responsible for 71 percent of
all global emissions.6 Exxon Mobil is responsible for 2 percent of all
global GHG emissions from 1988–2010.7 This makes it the fifth highest
emitting entity globally, and the first overall non-nation-state-owned
company.8 It ranks behind a nation state, China, and three nationally
owned oil and gas companies—Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, and National
Iranian Oil Company.9 It is thus not surprising that Exxon Mobil and other
large fossil fuel emitting companies have been the target of climate
1. See UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL
REPORT GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C (2018), HTTPS://WWW.IPCC.CH/SR15/
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/TJ4E-83S5]; DAVID REIDMILLER, U.S. GLOBAL RESEARCH
PROGRAM, ET AL., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT Ch. 2 (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/1/
[https://perma.cc/R5DS-C2V2]
[hereinafter National Climate Assessment].
2. National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 37.
3. See id. at 36, 39–40.
4. PAUL GRIFFIN, CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017 at 7 (2017),
https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15febc70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.co
m/cms/reports/documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report2017.pdf?1499691240 [https://perma.cc/L88V-B2AF] [hereinafter Carbon Majors].
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 8.
7. See id.; see also Tess Riley, Just 100 Fossil Fuel Companies Responsible for
71% of Global Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/2017/jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71global-emissions-cdp-study-climate-change [https://perma.cc/VA73-HUVY].
8. Carbon Majors, supra note 4, at 8.
9. Id.
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change litigation. The use of securities laws for climate change litigation
is, however, a relatively new phenomenon.10
To understand the current use of the securities laws to address
climate change, it is important to discuss the recent climate change
litigation history. A decade prior to New York’s lawsuit, federal public
nuisance theory was used against large fossil fuel companies.11 However,
in 2011 and 2012, two rulings heralded the demise of federal public
nuisance under the displacement theory.12
The more recent phenomenon is the use of “proxy cost” in climate
change securities disclosure litigation.13 Proxy cost is defined as the
present financial cost of future governmental regulatory action.14
According to New York’s lawsuit, it affects present day value of the
company, including its investment decisions, business planning, assets,
and estimates of future demand for oil and gas.15 New York’s lawsuit
alleges differing internal and publicly represented proxy costs.16
However, proxy cost suffers from the challenge of quantification, as the
regulation nor its cost exist.17
Scholars argue that securities litigation in general suffers from
circular wealth transfers.18 They argue that when a secondary purchaser
of securities successfully claims that the company has made false or
misleading material representations causing an inflated purchase price,

10. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011); Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012).
11. Summons & Complaint at 17, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018,
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
12. Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 424; Native Vill., 696 F.3d. at 857 (stating that “[w]hen
Congress has acted to occupy the entire field, that action displaces any previously
available federal common law action”) (citation omitted). Displacement theory refers to
when a federal statute addresses the same issue and offers a remedy for an overlapping
federal common law right, therefore rendering the common law right void.
13. Summons & Complaint, supra note 11, at 27.
14. Id. (stating that “Exxon has repeatedly and falsely assured investors that it has
taken active and consistent steps to protect the company’s value from the risk that climate
change regulation poses to its business.”).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 27–28.
17. See Summons & Complaint supra, note 14, at 27.
18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay
on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556 (2006); see also
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1502 (1996).
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the shareholders—who are forced to bear the recovery—are usually
innocent of any wrongdoing.19 In addition, “neither the defendant
corporation nor its continuing shareholders ordinarily benefit from the
plaintiffs’ purchases,” as they are sold on a secondary market.20 This
occurs because the class is certified by the period in which the securities
were bought, thereby leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt
of the penalties brought against the corporation.21 If they remain
shareholders, the harmed shareholder group is penalized, along with the
corporation.22
Thus, damages would not be adequately apportioned to address the
external costs of climate change in a securities disclosure lawsuit.23 The
cases brought by New York and the federal class in Ramirez are based on
similar theory and facts, and both seek to reimburse the shareholders who
purchased securities on the secondary market.24 Therefore, the outcome
of the lawsuits effectuates a circular wealth transfer and inadequately
addresses any externalized harm.25
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) serves to prevent and mitigate risks to the stability of the
American financial system.26 Dodd-Frank was developed and passed as a
response to the 2008 Recession, where the collapse of mortgage-backed
securities triggered a bank liquidity crisis.27 This Note delves into the
requirements for Significant Financial Institutions (SIFIs)—the largest
financial institutions capable of causing systemic economic harm, and
proposes new climate-related securities disclosure laws in order to
remedy external, climate change-related harms. Specifically, this Note
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 1556.
Id.
Id. at 1557.
Id.
See id.
See Summons & Complaint at 95, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
452044/2018, 2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018); Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
25. See generally id.
26. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325(a)(1), 5365(a)(1) (2012).
27. The Act seeks to prevent the societal risks that come from the financial distress
or failure of large, interconnected financial institutions, which include large scale job
loss, foreclosure, and lack of ability to secure credit. Dealbook, Obama Moves to Limit
‘Reckless Risk’ of Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/01/21/obama-moves-to-limit-reckless-risks-of-banks/?searchResultPosition=4
[https://perma.cc/6QYM-XFUM].
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proposes using the SIFI “stress tests,” or periodic disclosure of liquidity
and compliance, and the SIFI liquidity requirement itself, as models for
the creation of a mandated environmental, societal, and governmental
(ESG) reporting framework for climate change disclosure. The proposal
also uses an extension of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) “fair fund” authority under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SarbanesOxley) as a legal basis to recoup societal losses from climate change.
This Note assesses whether securities laws are an effective
mechanism to combat climate change, with a focus on harm and remedies.
Part II discusses the recent use of the federal and state securities laws in
the climate change disclosure context, with a focus on the use of proxy
cost. Part III centers on the challenge of quantifying future proxy cost and
discusses the criticism of shareholder security fraud lawsuits as a circular
wealth transfer. Part IV uses the SIFI regulation created under DoddFrank as a tool of comparison to propose a new framework for climate
change regulation that realizes external costs.
I. THE RISE OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AS A MECHANISM TO COMBAT
FRAUDULENT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
A. FAILED PUBLIC NUISANCE ATTEMPTS
Many climate change lawsuits against large fossil fuel-emitting
companies used federal environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act
(CAA) or the National Environmental Policy Act, or federal common law
tort public nuisance theory.28 Federal environmental statutes have limited
remedies for private claimants,29 and the doctrine of displacement has
effectively extinguished climate change claims under public nuisance
theory.30
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the
authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, thereby displacing
28. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011);
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007); Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d. 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2012).
29. No private damages are available under the CAA. See Karine Peloffy, Kivalina
v. Exxonmobil: A Comparative Case Comment, 9 MCGILL INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV.
L. AND POL’Y 119, 121, 127 (2012) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
doctrine of displacement in Kivalina).
30. Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 424; Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 857.
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any claim for injunctive relief under public nuisance theory for climate
change.31 Shortly thereafter, in Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., the Ninth Circuit extended the displacement holding in American
Electric to claims for monetary damages,32 even though the damages
sought in Kivalina in this action were not available to it under the CAA.33
Along with displacement, it is challenging to show prima facie
climate change-caused damages.34 For example, in Kivalina, the District
Court found there was no way to determine whether Exxon Mobil and the
rest of the defendants’ emissions could be attributed to the plaintiff’s
environmental damage suffered.35
Ultimately, the current New York lawsuit was initiated to recoup
investor loss.36 However, this Note assumes that New York State also
seeks to combat the negative effects of climate change through securities
litigation.37
B. THE 2008 SETTLEMENT
A decade before the current New York lawsuit against Exxon Mobil
commenced, New York used the Martin Act to subpoena multiple utility
and energy companies.38 The New York State Attorney General sought

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 423–24.
Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 857.
Peloffy, supra note 29, at 127.
Id. at 142.
Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 868; see infra, Part II.B. It is argued that proxy costs
potentially suffer from a similar causal disconnect.
36. Summons & Complaint at 95, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018,
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
37. See Press Conference, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., et al., A.G.
Schneiderman, Former Vice President Al Gore and a Coalition of Attorneys General
from Across the Country Announce Historic State-Based Effort to Combat Climate
Change (Mar. 29, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-former-vicepresident-al-gore-and-coalition-attorneys-general-across
[https://perma.cc/B4YYCZTM].
38. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http:// www.nytimes.com/
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information about whether these companies’ investors were receiving
adequate information about the financial liabilities of carbon dioxide
emissions, citing potentially misleading reporting.39 The investigations
resulted in settlement agreements, most notably with two companies,
Dynegy and Xcel.40 The settlements required the inclusion of material
financial risks of GHG emissions in relation to climate change, including
stranded or impaired assets.41 The 2008 settlements’ success likely played
a role in the decision to initiate the current lawsuit against Exxon Mobil.42
C. THE CURRENT LAWSUITS
New York’s securities fraud lawsuit was filed against Exxon Mobil
on October 24, 2018.43 The lawsuit is the culmination of more than two
years of investigation under the Martin Act.44 The investigation
commenced in November 2015, after articles from Inside Climate News
and The Los Angeles Times alleged the company covered up its own

2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/9CLJ-5EU8]; see also Rick
E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010
Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 513–14 (2012); Kevin
Poloncarz & Amy June, Bingham McCutchen LLP, New York Attorney General Reaches
Major Settlements with Power Producers Regarding Disclosure of Risks of Climate
Change (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_
Bingham-McCutchen-LLP_581598.htm [https://perma.cc/3MNZ-2BVZ] (quoting the
Xcel & Dynegy agreements).
39. See Hansen, supra, note 38, at 514.
40. See Poloncarz, supra note 38; see also Hansen, supra note 38, at 514.
41. See Hansen, supra note 38, at 514.
42. See generally Summons & Complaint, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
452044/2018, 2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
43. Id. at 1; see also John S. Baker, Jr., Warning to Corporate Counsel: If State AGs
Can Do This to ExxonMobil, How Safe is Your Company?, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
313, 314–15 (2017).
44. Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, ExxonMobil Investigated for Possible Climate
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-innew-york-over-climate-statements.html [https://perma.cc/T7GL-9VBM].
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climate change research for over thirty years.45 Eric Schneiderman—New
York’s Attorney General at the time—initiated the investigation, alleging
the company did not disclose its own conclusive knowledge of climate
change to investors.46
By summer 2017, Eric Schneiderman narrowed the scope of the
investigation to focus on how Exxon Mobil had two separate financial
calculations for the proxy cost of future regulatory action related to
climate change: an internal, lower or non-existent proxy cost, and a
publicly represented, higher proxy cost.47
The lawsuit contains several allegations, most importantly, that
Exxon Mobil failed to apply the proxy cost it represented to the public.48
In its place, the company used a lower, undisclosed proxy cost contained
in internal corporate guidance, a further lower cost based on a static
number, accounting for existing regulations held flat for decades into the
future, or no cost associated with GHG emissions.49 Additionally, in
projecting demand for oil and gas, Exxon Mobil did not apply its public
proxy cost to the transportation sector.50 It also did not apply proxy costs
to its GHG emissions for long-term assets before 2016.51
The federal class actions brought against Exxon Mobil by pension
funds over the past two years rest on similar theories of proxy cost fraud.52
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp. alleges Exxon Mobil failed to disclose the
actual proxy cost of carbon it used and failed to use when calculating
45. Neela Banerjee, et al., Exxon: The Road not Taken: Exxon Confirmed Global
Warming Consensus in 1982 with In-House Climate Models, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18092015/exxon-confirmedglobalwarming-consensus-in-1982-with-in-house-climate-models
[https://perma.cc/38YVL5UB]; Michael Hiltzik, A new study shows how Exxon Mobil downplayed climate
change when it knew the problem was real, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-exxonmobil-20170822-story.html
[https://perma.cc/V3NK-754Q].
46. Gillis & Krauss, supra note 44.
47. Emily Flitter, NY Prosecutor Says Exxon Misled Investors on Climate Change,
REUTERS (June 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-climatechange-exxonidUSL1N1IZ0O4 [https://perma.cc/Q4RE-WB5R].
48. Summons & Complaint at 27, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018,
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. at 80.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 04 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576–80 (S.D. Tex. 2018);
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018).

164

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXV

capital expenditures and other business and investment decisions.53
Although dismissed, Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp. alleged Exxon Mobil
and several of its executives knew the prices of oil reserves and other
assets were overvalued because it did not adequately address the known
cost of climate change before writing them down.54 Part III.A. compares
these lawsuits in further detail.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE FRAUD SUITS ANALYZED:
DO THEY ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOAL?
A. CAN PROXY COST BE TRUSTED?
The outcome of Fentress demonstrates that securities fraud lawsuits
based on proxy cost misstatements are challenging to prove in court.55
The Southern District of Texas stated the price of future reserves were
more likely to have been written down because the price of oil dropped
precipitously.56 The Court also stated that competitors declared impaired
reserves in 2014 through 2016, rather than realizing the failure to account
for a more accurate future climate change regulatory cost.57 The Court
also determined that even if Exxon Mobil did not effectively publicly
divulge the climate change information, investors knew of the risks of
climate change.58 Because publicly available information existed during
the class period, the Court ruled the market incorporated this information
into the price.59
The Court also noted that because fossil fuels are likely to remain the
majority of the global energy supply before 2040 based on information
provided by the Energy Information Agency, allegations of stranded
assets due to climate change regulation and the transition away from fossil
fuels are “conclusory and inconsistent” with the reports.60 The Court
concluded its analysis by stating that securities fraud did not provide a
mechanism to address the questionable “ethical norms for a company to

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 846.
Fentress, 04 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
See generally id. at 587.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 578.
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know that its business contributes to global harm and at the same time to
expect to continue to profit from that business.”61
The plaintiff pension fund in Ramirez used the same approach, yet
focused on the exact communications proving a different internal cost
used by the CEO and other executives, $40 per ton at 2030, as opposed to
the publicly represented number, $80 per ton at 2040.62 The New York
lawsuit alleges the same claims on the same facts as Ramirez.63 The
internal communications suggest using a different internal cost of $40 per
ton at 2030, as opposed to the publicly represented number, $60 per ton.64
Although the plaintiff’s pension fund in Fentress alleged Exxon
Mobil and its executives had a different internal proxy cost than the
publicly stated price, in hindsight it failed to provide this specific proof.65
The Court in Ramirez also did not raise the same findings denouncing the
significance of proxy cost calculation, among other possible factors, into
the devaluation of assets as the Fentress court.66
Ultimately, proxy cost is a challenging metric, as it is difficult for
courts to trust figures that quantify future regulatory cost.67 However,
future regulatory action can be estimated by use of accurate accounting
models.68 As evidenced in Ramirez, if there is sufficient evidence the
company had two different public and internal figures for proxy cost, a
prima facie showing of misrepresentation can be made.69 Proxy cost also
presents a challenge as it relates to the requirement of materiality, which
is what an investor might deem important before the sale or acquisition of
a security.70

61.
62.

Id. at 579.
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 846 (N.D. Tex. 2018);
EXXON
MOBIL,
CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP
REPORT
38
(2015),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/~/media/Global/Files/sustainabilityreport/publication/2015-ccr-full-digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4GV-SH2K].
63. Summons & Complaint at 15, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018,
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
64. Id. at 22.
65. See Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 845–47.
66. See id.; see also Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576–80
(S.D. Tex. 2018).
67. See Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 576–80.
68. About Us, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, https://ghgprotocol.org/about-us (last
visited March 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CB9T-9DV3] [hereinafter GHG Protocol].
69. See Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 845–47.
70. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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B. PROXY COST, ESG REPORTING, AND MATERIALITY
In 2010, the SEC released an Interpretive Release that clarified the
applicability of disclosing climate change proxy costs.71 Proxy costs are
an aspect of the broader ESG required disclosure found in the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of a company’s
SEC disclosure.72 Though the Interpretive Release did not impose new
disclosure requirements or take a position on whether climate change
exists, it indicated that the direct and indirect effects of climate change on
a registrant’s business may be material73 to its investors and,74 therefore,
require disclosure in the registrant’s SEC filings.75 The SEC
acknowledged that local, state, federal, and international regulation of
GHG emissions may require registrants to increase capital expenditures
to reduce GHG emissions or incur expenses related to participation in
regulatory schemes.76 The SEC further stated that registrants who may not
be directly affected by such developments could still be indirectly and
materially affected, for example, from changes in supply-chain prices.77
In general, SEC disclosures require three types of material under
SEC Rule S-K, which includes 10-Q quarterly reports and 10-K updates

71. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING
DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 61, 469, 75
Fed. Reg. 6, 290 (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WW5Y-VSFN] [hereinafter Interpretive Release]; see Hansen, supra
note 38.
72. Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn, Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by
Sector Analysis of SEC 10-K Filings from 1995-2008, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
721, 723 (2009); see Hansen, supra note 38, at 488.
73. A material fact, or materiality, means “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable shareholder as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TSC Indus., 426 U.S.
at 448 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
74. Federal law makes it illegal “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(2012).
75. Interpretive Release, supra note 71, at 6, 290–91; Hansen, supra note 38, at 488.
76. Interpretative Release, supra note 71, at 6, 291.
77. Id.
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to quarterly reports.78 Item 103 requires disclosure of material pending
legal proceedings and Item 303 mandates disclosure of management’s
analysis of the financial condition and results of operations of the
company, including the financial costs of future litigation, regulation, or
legislation.79 To comply with Item 303, management must evaluate
whether the pending legislation or regulation is reasonably likely to be
enacted.80 Unless management determines that it is not reasonably likely
to be enacted, it must proceed on the assumption that the legislation or
regulation will be enacted.81 Second, management must determine
whether the legislation or regulation, if enacted, is reasonably likely to
have a material effect on the registrant, its financial condition or results
of operations.82 Unless management determines that a material effect is
not reasonably likely, MD&A disclosure is required.83
Materiality is largely an economic-oriented analysis, as a reasonable
shareholder invests for economic reasons.84 However, there is no
generally accepted calculation or formula for determining materiality.85
Both the SEC and courts have resisted any attempt to formulate a bright-

78. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496–508; see also Constance Wagner, Corporate
Environmental Reporting and Climate Change Risk: The Need for Reform of Securities
and Exchange Commission Disclosure Rules, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 151,
157–58 (2009).
79. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496–508.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered
Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 690 (2009) (“While carbon-impact
information might be important to the buying and selling decisions of some, even many,
environmentally concerned individuals, the legal standard is that of an objective
‘reasonable shareholder,’ who is presumed to invest in order to make money.”).
85. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011) (rejecting
statement that “adverse event reports that do not reveal a statistically significant increased
risk of adverse events from product use are not material information”)(citation omitted);
United States v. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting bright-line test for
materiality); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting
bright-line tests for materiality and approving of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99);
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17 C.F.R. 211 (Aug. 19, 1999) (“[A] court must
consider “both ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ factors in assessing an item’s materiality
….”) [hereinafter SAB 99].
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line rule for materiality.86 In August 1999, the SEC issued Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, which acknowledged the practice of using
thresholds to determine whether something would be material.87 The SEC
acknowledged that the 5 percent materiality threshold is useful as a rough
metric.88 This threshold, used by some registrants and auditors, means that
a misstatement or omission that is below 5 percent of the company’s value
would not be material, absent any other “egregious” conduct.89 However,
the SEC warned against its exclusive reliance.90
In addition, for contingent or future events, the probability of the
event occurring must be weighed against the magnitude of the event.91
This aspect of the materiality rule is important for assessing climate
change, as its costs are largely intrinsic to the contingent nature of future
events.92 Assessing magnitude requires some determination of the
“degree of importance” of the development because “probability
essentially requires a look into a crystal ball in an effort to determine the
likelihood the development will occur.”93 Registrants have struggled and
may continue to struggle with assessing the materiality of developments
that may not be probable, but could have a significant impact on the issuer
if they occurred.94
C. SECURITIES LITIGATION AND CIRCULAR WEALTH TRANSFER
Scholars believe that securities laws essentially transfer wealth from
one set of shareholders to another.95 Professor John Coffee argues this
circular transfer occurs when secondary purchasers of securities
successfully sue.96 This wealth transfer occurs because the class is
certified by the period in which the securities were bought, therefore
leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt of the penalties

86. Litwin, 634 F.3d 706, 717 (rejecting bright-line tests for materiality and
approving of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99).
87. SAB 99, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
92. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496-508.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g, Coffee, Jr., supra note 18.
96. Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 1556.
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against the corporation.97 Sometimes, shareholders will be in both the
plaintiff class and the remaining shareholder class that bears the cost of
the litigation.98 This is because the shareholders purchased stock before
and during the class period.99 Therefore, these shareholders are making
wealth transfers to themselves, minus the cost of litigation.100
Large institutional investors are also making wealth transfers to
themselves without any benefit.101 A large pension fund may hold several
hundred stocks.102 Based on a calculation of the average amount of
securities class action cases, the plaintiff class consists of the pension fund
in half of all cases, and in the other half, it is the defendant class that
constitutes the pension fund. 103 Therefore, the pension fund will only
transfer wealth from one case to the next, without effectively gaining from
the transfer.104
Therefore, as Professor Coffee argues, the law should attempt to
impose a greater share of securities class actions’ costs on the more
culpable insiders rather than the company.105 He argues the most likely
beneficiaries of the fraud are the insiders who sold at inflated prices.106
However, securities lawsuits may include inside executives alongside the
corporation as defendants, and insurance would cover the settlement or
judgment amount.107 This presents a conflict of interest, as directors may
want to settle their own liability with corporate funds.108 Therefore, the
insiders who are most culpable escape personal liability in securities class
actions through insurance and corporate monies.109

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1554.
Id.
Id. at 1557–58.
Id.
Id.
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D. SECURITIES FRAUD AND SOCIETAL COST
When it comes to how the securities laws quantify harm caused,
there are varying perspectives.110 Some scholars raise the idea that the
diversified investor is not harmed.111 Diversified investors may not really
need compensation from litigation because they have diversified against
the risk of securities violations.112 Institutional investors diversify their
portfolios and change financial positions frequently.113 Therefore, the
chance of being on the losing or winning side of a transaction when the
stock price is distorted is essentially random.114
Institutional investors may be overcompensated by litigation.115
These investors will be compensated for losses through lawsuits, while
innocent gains are not accounted for from occasionally being the
advantaged party to fraud.116
There is also a normative argument, where any fraudulent conduct
should be morally condemned.117 There is a “societal need” to deter
securities fraud because fraud itself is a harm done to the public.118 In
many types of securities fraud—particularly civil securities fraud—the
requirement of scienter reinforces the argument that the morally culpable
individual should be punished.119 The origins of the securities laws
evidence this phenomenon, as many were created after significant market
downturns, such as the Great Depression and the Recession of 2008.120
The courts have identified at least eight other separate policies
underpinning securities fraud, most of which include costs to society and

110. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985); Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101
MARQ. L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2017); Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A
Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 1415, 1427–28; Coffee, Jr., supra note 18.
111. Easterbrook, supra note 110, at 641; Alexander, supra note 18, at 1502.
112. Alexander, supra note 18, at 1502.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Herschkopf, supra note 110, at 467–68; Olazábal, supra note 110, at 1427–28.
118. Olazabal, supra note 110, at 1427.
119. Herschkopf, supra note 110, at 468.
120. See id. at 476–79.
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the markets.121 These include maintaining free securities markets,
equalizing access to information, insuring equal bargaining strength,
providing for disclosure, protecting investors, assuring fairness, building
investor confidence, and deterring violations while compensating
victims.122
Many scholars ultimately agree that the societal impact of securities
fraud rests on investor confidence and subsequent loss of capital.123
Professor Coffee argues that the cumulative impact of the Enron and
WorldCom scandals between 2000 and 2002 made stockholders wary,
chilling the markets and causing investors to demand a higher return.124
When the cost of capital increases, the economy suffers—and thus,
society suffers as a result.125 Even smaller fraud cases may be aggregated,
and therefore, it is argued, do affect the markets negatively.126
The fundamental mechanism of securities laws is proper
disclosure.127 Disclosure is an essential aspect of investor confidence.128
When investors know what product they are receiving, and that the price
is accurate, markets function more efficiently.129 The markets rely on trust
and transparency, and disclosure is fundamental to these goals.130

121. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801, 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing free
markets, fairness, disclosure, protecting investors, equal access, and equalization of
bargaining position); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48, 851–52,
855, 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (mentioning fairness, equal access, deterrence, free markets,
disclosure, and protecting the investing public).
122. Herpich, 430 F.2d at 801, 806, 808; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847–48,
851–52, 855, 858, 860.
123. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1565–66.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“The 1934 Act was designed
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices . . . . Underlying the adoption of
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: There cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market
place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
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E. SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER DODD-FRANK,
SYSTEMICALLY FOCUSED REGULATION
1. Scope
Dodd-Frank was passed in 2010 with the goal of preventing and
mitigating “risks to the stability of the financial system of the United
States.”131 Dodd-Frank was developed and passed as a response to the
2008 Recession, where the collapse of mortgage-backed securities,
among other causes, triggered a bank liquidity crisis.132 Dodd-Frank seeks
to prevent risks that could arise from the financial distress or failure of
large interconnected financial institutions.133 It grants the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the power to regulate the largest
banks, which are those with more than $50 billion in assets.134 DoddFrank also grants the power to regulate non-financial institutions that
operate financial businesses that may significantly affect the financial
markets based on the size and nature of the business.135
2. Criteria
There is no specific threshold that the FSOC has that would
automatically include a company as a non-bank financial institution.136
However, the FSOC looks to a list of factors that would indicate a need
for enhanced regulatory oversight.137 The FSOC factors include: (a) the
extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company
with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank
holding companies; (b) the importance of the company as a source of
credit for households, businesses, and state and local governments and as
a source of liquidity for the United States financial system; (c) the
importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority,

131.
132.

12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1) (2012).
Binyamin Appelbaum & David Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift
on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/
business/16regulate.html [https://perma.cc/K4B4-Q3B6]; 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1)
(2012).
133. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1) (2012).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities;
and (d) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness,
and mix of the activities of the company, among other factors.138
As all administrative agencies are required to do, the FSOC must
state with particularity how the regulatory body made its decision.139 This
means the FSOC must state “what the actual [systemic financial] losses
would be” if the corporation went into financial distress and “how the
market would destabilize as a result.”140 Although the FSOC makes a
predictive judgment, it must be based on reasoned predictions.141 The
reasoning must also include an analysis of cost, where it must be
“appropriate” and “risk-weighted,” considering systemic risk and
insolvency risk compared to the regulatory cost imposed on the
company.142
3. Requirements Imposed
Once a company is deemed a non-bank financial institution, the
company must adhere to a list of standards imposed by the FSOC.143 The
most important aspect of this regulation is the same requirement imposed
on the regular SIFIs: nonbank financial institutions must maintain a debt
to equity ratio of no more than 15 to 1.144
Non-bank financial institutions are also prohibited from having
credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that exceeds 25 percent of
the capital stock and surplus.145 These companies may also be required to
establish a risk committee that would be responsible for the oversight of
the enterprise-wide risk management practices.146 Further regulations
may be prescribed, including periodic public disclosures by non-bank

138.
139.

Id.
Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 237
(D.D.C. 2016).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 241.
143. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A) (2012).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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financial institutions in order to support market evaluation of the risk
profile, capital adequacy, and risk management capabilities.147
Other requirements include potential intermediate holding company
requirements, examinations of liquidity through stress tests, and enhanced
reporting and information collection.148 In conducting its supervisory
stress tests, the Federal Reserve calculates the projections of each firm’s
balance sheet, risk-weighted assets, net income, and resulting regulatory
capital ratios under these scenarios using data on firms’ financial
conditions and risk characteristics provided by the firms and a set of
models developed or selected by the Federal Reserve.149
III. EXXON MOBIL AS SIGNIFICANT CARBON INSTITUTION? DODDFRANK INSPIRED REGULATION IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE ARENA
The proposed regulation seeks to capture negative externalities
associated with climate change, including harm to the economy and
vulnerable populations. The proposal does so through a loose comparison
to Dodd-Frank SIFI regulation. Much like Dodd-Frank’s SIFI regulation,
this proposal seeks to capture negative externalities.150 Dodd-Frank’s SIFI
regulation and the proposal seek to avoid large negative externalities
through greater disclosure and targeted requirements. The proposal goes
beyond proxy cost, to capture all climate change-related ESG reporting.
The proposal, although a proposed federal regulation, also recommends
to states to adopt a similar regulatory package.
First, the proposal requires the SEC to implement an emissions
reduction commitment for all disclosing companies, alongside a
standardized reporting framework. The framework adopted is the Climate
Change Reporting Framework (CCRF) created by the Climate Change
Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB).151 To calculate GHG emissions, the
proposal mandates the use of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG

147.
148.
149.

Id. § 5365(j)(3).
12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012).
U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE, DODD FRANK ACT STRESS TEST EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2018-june-dodd-frank-act-stresstest-executive-summary.htm [https://perma.cc/Y7FX-V7MM].
150. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012); Appelbaum, supra note 132.
151. CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING
FRAMEWORK—VERSION
1.1
(2012),
https://www.cdsb.net/sites/cdsbnet/files/
cdsbframework_v1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32PR-X7EC].
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Protocol) accounting methodology.152 Transparent and comprehensive
disclosure makes markets more efficient, as capital can be allocated to the
best investments.153 On the contrary, financial fraud creates chilling
effects on economic behavior and allows companies and their executives
to enjoy inflated share values and its associated benefits.154
Second, the proposal adopts a similar sanction framework as DoddFrank.155 Dodd-Frank permits the FSOC to recommend participating
agencies to force an over-leveraged, systemically compromising
company to divest assets or dissolve.156 This proposal grants the SEC the
asset divestiture power, but only as a last resort after a five-year grace
period. The proposal first focuses on monetary penalties and increasing
regulatory oversight in the event of non-compliance.
Third, the proposal expands the available SEC remedies to use
sanction funds to support climate change-related adaptation, mitigation,
and cleanup efforts for communities most affected—especially lowerincome and disadvantaged groups. The proposal provides for EPA
oversight of this program, given the agency is tasked with environmental
regulatory oversight. Although this remedy goes beyond the traditional
underpinnings of securities laws, as it is not “injured-shareholdercentric,”157 providing benefit to non-shareholders of the defendant
company, it furthers the fundamental legal goal of remedying harm
caused. Through fraudulent conduct, companies obtain inflated value
through material misstatements from climate change-causing business
practices.
Finally, the proposal recommends that the SEC and individual states
pursue climate change securities fraud lawsuits as opposed to relying on
private class actions to deter and remedy harmful conduct. Government
use of securities fraud is a better tool than private class actions for
remedying the external, societal costs of climate change.158 Private
securities litigation, especially when secondary purchasers sue, creates a
circular transfer, as plaintiff share classes obtain monetary remedy from

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See GHG Protocol, supra note 68.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.D.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(8) (2012).
Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887,
1906 (2013).
158. See supra Part II.C.
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the remaining stakeholders159 of the company.160 Government lawsuits
can obtain civil and criminal damages, which can indirectly compensate
the injured external, societal stakeholders.161 Furthermore, coupled with
standardized, frequent disclosures, federal and state governments will
ideally be able to bring more comprehensive cases to stop fraudulent
activity.
A. TRANSFER OF WEALTH FROM EXXON’S STAKEHOLDERS
TO EXXON’S SHAREHOLDERS
Securities litigation tends to create a circular wealth transfer when
secondary purchasers sue for material misrepresentation against a
corporation.162 Either the class is certified or the shareholder group is
named in a public lawsuit by the period in which the securities were
bought, therefore leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt of
the penalties against the corporation.163 The transfer of wealth occurs from
the stakeholder remainder group to the class shareholder group, even as
this group is not the source of the harm.164
In Ramirez and Fentress, both the plaintiff classes are pension funds,
which are diversified, institutional investors.165 The pension fund group is
one of many large investors comprising the pool of investors who own
Exxon Mobil.166 The New York lawsuit essentially seeks the same
damages as Ramirez and Fentress, albeit for a longer period and more
diverse shareholder group, as all shareholders in that period are

159. “Stakeholders” is a term that traditionally refers to those individuals, other than
shareholders, who have a stake in the success of a corporation, for example, labor,
creditors, consumers, and the surrounding community. See Stakeholder, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY
(2d
online
ed.)
https://thelawdictionary.org/stakeholders/
[https://perma.cc/FF8M-9ME3].
160. See supra Part II.C.
161. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1977); see also A.J. White
& Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 624 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
162. See supra Part II.C.
163. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1557.
164. See supra Part II.C.
165. Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576-80 (S.D. Tex. 2018);
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
166. Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
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included.167 The damages are the artificially inflated paid prices that
would not have been if the information was publicly known.168
Therefore, the climate change disclosure securities lawsuits, if
successful, would transfer the court calculated disgorgement amount from
the company to the shareholder group.169 This cost would effectively be
imposed on the remaining stakeholder group, comprised of shareholders
who were not in the lawsuit group, including executives, creditors,
suppliers, employees, and other groups reliant on Exxon Mobil’s value.170
This Note assumes, furthermore, that the New York lawsuit is largely
motivated by the desire to effectuate a carbon-accountable and emissionresponsible society. Therefore, the circular and internalized remedy does
not further its goal, apart from the element of deterrence.171 Funds are not
transferred to the harmed external parties.172
B. SCOPE
When large financial institutions underleverage and a market
downturn or significant financial loss occurs, causing insolvency and
bankruptcy, catastrophic societal costs are borne.173 One large insolvency
creates insolvencies for many other institutions.174 This leads to systemic
job loss, inability to obtain credit for businesses and consumers alike, and
foreclosures, among many other issues.175 Financial crises also affect
vulnerable communities, including low-income, minority, and
underserved populations.176 These communities are more likely to suffer
from job loss, lack of credit, and foreclosure.177 The societal risk from
underleveraging and risky financial behavior can be compared to the
societal risk of climate-related disaster from the overconsumption of
fossil fuels.
167. See Complaint at 7, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2018 WL
5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
168. Id. at 86.
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. See supra Part II.C.
171. See supra Part II.C.
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See Lea Deutsch, Collateral Damage: Mitigating the Effects of Foreclosure in
Communities, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012).
174. Id. at 208.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 209.
177. Id.
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Overconsumption leads to overaccumulation of GHG emissions in
the atmosphere, worsening the effects of climate change.178 The societal
costs associated with climate change include loss of life, loss of habitable
area, loss of private and public property, inadequate nutrition, and
increased exposure to environmental toxins, among many others.179 These
costs are due to sea-level rises, droughts, crop yield decreases,
temperature increases, climate fluctuations, and severe weather events.180
These societal costs harm the national economy by increasing the cost of
healthcare, energy, essential items, and insurance, lowering corporate
profits from stranded assets and damaged property.181 These costs also
increase the financial burdens of municipalities and governments in
adaptation, mitigation, and cleanup efforts, among many others.182
Climate change particularly harms vulnerable communities.183
Children, pregnant women, and the elderly are more sensitive to elevated
levels of pollution, environmental toxins, and heat exposure.184 Lowerincome communities are more likely to be exposed to extreme heat,
groundwater, and air pollution.185 The ability to perceive the risks to
which the impoverished are exposed, their ability to respond to evacuation
and emergency warnings, and their ability to relocate to a safer location
is lower than other communities.186 Lower-income communities are also
more likely to lack the financial ability to pay the costs associated with
rebounding from a disaster.187 Additionally, blue collar workers—such as
farm workers, construction workers, utility repair workers, emergency
responders, and other outdoor laborers—have a greater risk of exposure
to climate change-related harms.188

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See generally NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at Ch. 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Climate change also has the potential to disrupt financial markets.189
Climate change weather events, like severe droughts or hurricanes, can
create stranded assets for corporations and increase risk for insurance
companies.190 If the event is large enough, the manifested risks may not
be effectively shifted from a company’s financial portfolio, causing
market-influencing insolvency.191
C. PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS
1. A Mandate: Targeted Proxy and ESG Reporting
Both large and small investors demand more comprehensive ESG
reporting.192 Both financial and non-financial ESG information is
becoming more important to investors in evaluating and comparing
investments.193 The Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute
conducted a survey of 47,000 analysts and portfolio managers in 2017.194
The results of the survey found that 73 percent of the respondents take
ESG issues into account in their investment analysis and decisions.195 The
three most cited factors limiting the respondents’ organization’s ability to
use ESG information in investment decisions are “a lack of appropriate
189. Coral Davenport, Climate Change Poses Major Risks to Financial Markets,
Regulator Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/11/climate/climate-financial-market-risk.html [https://perma.cc/KPD6-PW6H];
BANQUE DE FRANCE, ET. AL, NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FIRST
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 14–19 (2019), https://www.banque-france.fr/en/financialstability/international-role/network-greening-financial-system/first-ngfs-progress-report
[https://perma.cc/HDX8-RQ7L].
190. Davenport, supra note 189.
191. Id.
192. See GOLDMAN SACHS EQUITY RESEARCH, GS SUSTAIN ESG SERIES: A
REVOLUTION RISING-FROM LOW CHATTER TO LOUD ROAR
(2018),
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/new-energy-landscape-folder/esgrevolution-rising/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ5S-RXRD] (“the ESG Revolution is just
beginning, as the logical, empirical and anecdotal evidence for its importance continue
to mount.”).
193. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/ZX3F-ZACV].
194. CFA
INSTITUTE,
ESG
SURVEY
REPORT
2017
(2017),
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/esg-survey-report-2017.ashx
[https://perma.cc/N3PF-43WY].
195. Id.
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quantitative ESG information, a lack of comparability across firms, and
questionable data quality or lack of assurance.”196
A group of the largest public investors in 2017, including state
treasurers, public pension funds, unions, legal experts and ESG reporting
advocates petitioned the SEC “to promptly initiate rule-making to
develop mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality,
comparable, decision-useful [ESG] information.”197 The group
emphasized that standardized disclosure is critical for evaluating
companies’ long-term performance and risk management.198 They stated
that while some companies voluntarily disclose, varying reporting
methods make it difficult for investors to compare companies or rely on
the information for their investment decisions.199
Larry Fink, the Chairman and CEO of BlackRock—currently the
world’s largest asset manager with $5.98 trillion in assets under
management—is an important voice on the issue.200 He continually
advocates for the largest companies to disclose their ESG risks given a
changing landscape that requires more disclosure from the investing
public.201 In his 2019 Letter to CEOs, he emphasized that with the world
undergoing the largest transfer of wealth in history, trillions of dollars
transferring hands from baby boomers to millennials, ESG matters will
be increasingly material to corporate valuations.202 He emphasized that
BlackRock focuses its resources on increasing the accuracy and breadth
of its analytics for measuring ESG factors, helping its clients implement
similar systems and thereby providing a model for other corporations.203
Fink further emphasized the financial necessity for increased ESG metrics
196.
197.

Id.
CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS & JILL E. FISCH, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING PURSUANT
TO RULE 192(A) OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S (SEC) RULE OF
PRACTICE
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RSC-3RFV].
198. Id.
199. Hazel Bradford, SEC urged by institutions to mandate ESG disclosure, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.pionline.com/article/20181002/
ONLINE/181009935/sec-urged-by-institutions-to-mandate-esg-disclosure
[https://perma.cc/RB4E-2GB2].
200. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock’s assets fall below $6 trillion mark, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blackrocks-assets-fall-below-6trillion-mark-2019-01-16 [https://perma.cc/B9CN-DXZ2].
201. Id.
202. See Fink supra, note 193.
203. Id.
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and disclosure, as “stakeholders [will] reap rewards over the long-term . .
. and [c]ompanies that ignore them stumble and fail.”204
Exxon Mobil has felt the pressure of investors to disclose more
comprehensive ESG metrics.205 In December 2018, Exxon Mobil
shareholders issued a resolution to set GHG emissions reduction targets,
which is the first of its kind at Exxon Mobil.206 The resolution suggests
reduction targets in line with the Paris Climate agreement.207 The effort
was led by New York State Comptroller, Thomas DiNapoli, as a trustee
of the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and the Church of
England’s investment fund.208 Other large investors support the
resolution, including the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System, HSBC Global Asset Management, Presbyterian Church USA,
and Fonds de Solidarité des Travailleurs du Québec.209 The resolution was
developed with the Climate Action 100+, a global initiative with 310
investors and more than $32 trillion assets under management.210 Other
large oil companies, like Royal Dutch Shell (Shell), also face growing
investor pressure.211
Given pressure from a significant portion of the world’s largest
investors, this Note proposes a mandated GHG emissions reduction
framework and required quarterly reporting of accurate climate changerelated internal data. The proposal seeks to standardize all GHG emissions
climate change reporting, rather than varied, non-standardized ESG
reporting and proxy costs that are currently being used by corporations.212
The CCRF does not specify rules for the calculation of GHG emissions,213
204.
205.

Id.
Marissa Luck, Investors pressure Exxon on climate emissions, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Investorspressure-Exxon-to-curb-greenhouse-gas-13472230.php
[https://perma.cc/6PYJN4RR?type=image].
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Joint statement between institutional investors on
behalf of Climate Action 100+ and Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell), (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2018/joint-statement-betweeninstitutional-investors-on-behalf-of-climate-action-and-shell.html
[https://perma.cc/7BS7-F4F4] [hereinafter Shell Joint Statement].
212. CDSB, supra note 151.
213. Id.
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therefore, the proposed regulation mandates the use of the GHG Protocol
developed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as the GHG
emissions accounting methodology.214 The WRI and WBCSD have
created many easy-to-use tools to calculate corporate emissions.215
Among Fortune 500 companies, 92 percent of companies responding to
the Climate Disclosure Project used GHG Protocol directly or indirectly
through a program based on GHG Protocol.216 GHG Protocol provides the
accounting platform for virtually every type of corporate GHG emissions
reporting program in the world.217
The ESG reporting mandate, alongside the GHG emissions reduction
target, will serve as a climate change “stress test” within the proposed
regulatory framework. The “stress test” will provide the markets with
more accurate and comprehensive data.218 Better disclosure makes
markets more efficient219 and also serves to deter fraudulent conduct.220
Much like Dodd-Frank’s requirement for the FSOC and the Federal
Reserve to conduct regular stress tests for SIFIs to mitigate potential risk,
periodic disclosure within a regulatory reduction framework serves the
same end.221
Instead of relying on prospectus information, voluntary disclosure,
or internal documentation, the New York Attorney General, other
prosecutors, and the investing public can rely on comprehensive quarterly
disclosures for more accurate information.222 They can compare this
information to their own findings—whether through investigative means
or through third party analysts and independent sources—to find any
evidence of inaccurate or fraudulent information.223 This will serve to
make disclosure easier to use, and evidence of fraud or inaccurate or
misstated information easier to find.224 Additionally, the proposal may
have the effect of creating more securities fraud liability through material
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See GHG Protocol, supra note 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.1.
See supra Part III.D.1.
See supra Part III.D.1.
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misstatements for corporations, given the comprehensiveness required in
the disclosures.225 This is not to punish, but to create a more transparent
and accountable environment. The proposal seeks deterrence through
enhanced disclosure and litigation risk.
The enhanced GHG emissions and climate change disclosure
framework developed by this proposal may only be mandated for
companies that emit more than a certain threshold of GHG. However,
since it is not a required practice to disclose GHG emissions, it would be
necessary to first require the disclosure before implementing a
threshold.226 The threshold would serve to eliminate unnecessary cost and
effort spent on disclosure on businesses whose operations would not
significantly contribute to climate change. An initial proposed threshold
could be around 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide per year, based on
data from utilities and oil producers compared to smaller corporate
entities.227 For comparison, a typical passenger vehicle emits about 4.6
metric tons of carbon dioxide per year.228 Once a company passes beyond
the threshold, disclosure would be required.
By requiring specific disclosure on GHG emissions, investors will
be better equiped to mitigate climate change-related risks in their portfolio
through diversification, and companies will be deterred from using the
lack of mandatory reporting for financial gain from greater valuation than
may exist.229 Mandatory social reporting also reduces strategic disclosure
and gaming of reporting, which involves the voluntary disclosure of
portions of ESG data to avoid inquiry about other data, or to provide
225.
226.
227.

See supra Part III.D.1.
See GHG Protocol, supra note 68, at 3.
See generally CON EDISON, 2016–2017 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT: GHG
REDUCTIONS (2017) https://www.conedison.com/ehs/2016-sustainability-report/safetyand-environment/gng-emissions-reductions-introduction/
[https://perma.cc/XA2CFLYT];
APPLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
(2018),
https://www.apple.com/environment/pdf/Apple_Environmental_Responsibility_Report
_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/39R3-6QH3]; ALLEGIANT AIR, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT
(2017),
http://ir.allegiantair.com/static-files/fe794c1e-040f-48ac-8321-6a1fb76972a4
[https://perma.cc/B8B6-935H]; ALTRA INDUSTRIAL MOTION, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT
(2017),
https://s22.q4cdn.com/325574979/files/doc_financials/2017/2017_Altra_Annual_Repor
t.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FKR-2MMS].
228. EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle (accessed
March 15, 2019) https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typicalpassenger-vehicle [https://perma.cc/RGJ8-7F3Y].
229. See supra Part III.D.1.
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general, non-helpful ESG data to investors.230 Mandatory disclosure also
requires fiduciaries to act in a socially-responsible manner.231
Furthermore, it already exists in other contexts.232
Dodd-Frank contains a “conflict minerals” provision.233 This
provision requires reporting companies to disclose to the SEC their
internal measures to exercise due diligence and chain of custody of
minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or adjacent
countries which have historically been linked to civil strife, human rights
abuses, and violence.234 The human rights impact of conflict minerals
directly and indirectly involves business.235 For example, local mining
companies and their security providers are directly involved in human
rights abuses such as forced labor.236 Further, an array of companies—
both locally based and multi-national—that buy, trade, transport, process,
and finance the purchase of conflict minerals may fund and thereby
perpetuate the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.237
Dodd-Frank’s conflicts provision seeks to restrict funding sources
for armed groups in the Congo through the dissemination of information
about the connection between their commercial activity and human rights
violations.238 Targeted climate change disclosure seeks to eliminate
externalized harms similarly stemming from business practices.239
However, the conflicts provision does not have a remedy for noncompliance.240 It solely relies on the reputational effects of noncompliance.241
This proposal, however, contains monetary, enhanced oversight, and
divestiture remedies. Rather than focusing on the passive means of
reputational deterrence, these remedies serve to directly and actively deter
230. Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility,
111 PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2006) (arguing that mandatory disclosure of CSR
impacts reduces the “gaming” of social responsibility performance).
231. Id.
232. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate
Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 106 (2014).
233. Id. at 90.
234. Id. at 106.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 91–92.
240. Id. at 106–07.
241. Id. at 91–92.
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continued non-compliance. The proposal’s focus on direct, severe
sanction mechanisms seeks to create a regime of greater corporate
compliance.242 Additionally, mandatory climate change ESG disclosure
will also aid investors and corporations in calculating related reputational
risks.243
Corporations are aware of the risks to their brands from adverse
human rights, environmental, and labor impacts in their supply chains.244
Additionally, specific disclosure may complement reputational harm by
making violations of social norms related to climate change more
unambiguous, as they will be codified in law.
One objection is that it suggests that adverse social impacts can be
quantified.245 Risk, it is argued, is itself defined by societal and political
norms that define what type of events create “risk” in the first place.246
However, as reputational risks include an estimation of how these risks
affect the business and its valuation, the challenge of quantification
should not count out its beneficial societal and market-transparent effect.
2. Proposal: Stress Test
The specific proposal follows the December 3, 2018 commitments
made by Royal Dutch Shell.247 Shell agreed to commit to a 50 percent
reduction in GHG emissions, with an interim commitment of 20 percent
by 2035.248 Shell also committed to setting three- or five-year periodic
goals to meet both interim and final commitments.249 Shell’s long-term
reduction commitments are the highest of any other large company in the

242. See e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative
Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 89 (2012) (“[A] legal regime with
clear standards that stipulate required action or course of conduct (rules-based regime) is
the approach that generates greater corporate commitment to legal compliance.”).
243. See id.
244. See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams, & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for
Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 338–42 (2008).
245. Di Lorenzo, supra note 242.
246. Id.
247. Shell Joint Statement, supra note 211.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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oil and gas sector.250 The commitment includes Scope 1 and 2 emissions,
which are the direct emission from company operations, and emissions
from energy use by the company, respectively.251
However, Shell also committed its Scope 3 emissions, which include
any emissions from the corporation’s products or supply-stream.252 Scope
3 is the most expansive, as it also accounts for emissions from the use of
the fossil fuels sold by Shell.253 The proposal adopts Shell’s interim and
long-term reduction commitment—including Scope 1, 2, and 3
emissions—to all disclosing companies above 10 metric tons of carbon
dioxide per year.254
The proposal has consequences for non-compliance to target
reduction similar to those of non-compliance for non-bank SIFIs. DoddFrank permits the FSOC to recommend participating agencies to force an
over-leveraged, systemically compromising company to divest assets or
dissolve.255 For example, if the proposal starts in 2020, once a disclosing
company is deemed non-compliant at either the 15 (2035) or 30-year
(2050) target, the SEC, with the EPA’s guidance, would issue monetary
penalties and provide recommendations for reduction. If further noncompliance occurs over the course of the next five-year target cycle, the
SEC and EPA could force the divestiture of non-compliant assets or
divisions.
As the FSOC’s administrative reasoning must include an analysis of
cost, so does the proposal.256 The analysis of cost must be “appropriate”
and consider “risk-related” factors, which include systemic risk and
insolvency risk compared to the regulatory cost imposed on the

250. Ron Bousso, Shell to set sector-leading targets after investor pressure, REUTERS,
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-carbon/shell-to-set-sectorleading-emissions-targets-after-investor-pressure-idUSKBN1O20NK
[https://perma.cc/B87T-YVQW].
251. GHG Protocol, FAQ, (accessed May 13, 2019), https://ghgprotocol.org/
sites/default/files/standards_supporting/ FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MNA-JKHG].
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(5)(B) (2012).
256. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 241
(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that FSOC’s designation of a large insurance company as a SIFI
was “arbitrary and capricious” because it failed to consider the economic costs of its
determination), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 1624 *3 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
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company.257 Given the significant and systemic climate-related risks to
the national economy and vulnerable populations of continued GHG
emissions,258 the proposal would be an appropriate regulation, as the risks
it addresses outweigh the regulatory burden of a 30-year emissions target
and disclosure regime. The proposal also considers “risk-related” factors,
as it takes into account an adequate timeframe—30 years—to
significantly reduce the corporation’s emissions. The weight of economic
and societal harm outweighs the harm of any one corporation’s reduction
in emissions over the course of 30 years.
The proposal’s general requirements follow the CCRF and GHG
Protocol.259 Disclosures must include a strategic analysis of risk and
governance.260 This includes “[m]anagement’s view of the extent to which
the organization’s strategy and operational performance are affected by
climate change-related risks and opportunities . . . .”261 Disclosures must
also include governance processes for addressing those effects, which
provides vital information for investors and decision-makers in assessing
the condition of the organization.262
The CCRF additionally mandates information about the future
outlook and any uncertainties or key dependencies related to climate
change and a company’s business.263 This information is decision-useful
when it (a) describes long-term strategic developments that may enhance
opportunities or increase risk, such as organic growth or decline,
acquisitions or divestments and operational changes; (b) includes
estimates of investment in or the cost of GHG emissions abatement or
climate change adaptation that could materially affect the growth, future
earnings and the direction of the organization; (c) includes an estimate of
future movements in direct and indirect GHG emissions, taking account
of expected GHG emissions, energy efficiency, and reduction plans; and
(d) estimates any cost savings associated with GHG emissions abatement
and energy efficiency expectations.264
For the specific GHG emissions reporting information, both the
CCRF and GHG Protocol mandate the inclusion of movements in GHG
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
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emissions results over time, along with a description of activities that
caused them and the reasons behind them.265 In terms of the target
emission reduction, both the CCRF and GHG Protocol require
information that, in order to be decision-useful, (a) specifies the GHG
emissions reduction activities and sources; (b) describes the activities and
investments required to achieve the plans and any risks or limiting factors
that might affect achievement of the plans and targets; (c) analyzes
progress to date against previously set plans or targets; and (d) analyzes
progress against regional, national, international, or sectoral targets.266
3. Community Stakeholders as Recognized by the Market and the Law
Corporations widely recognize their effect on community
stakeholders.267 One such company is Swiss Re, a large reinsurance
company that has been at the forefront of recognizing climate change as
a threat to its business.268 Swiss Re has stated its “actions are based on the
premise that it is in the interest of shareholders, clients and employees,
the wider stakeholder community and society in general to tackle this
[climate change] issue.”269
Many energy companies also understand the need to incorporate the
wider community, as their business is intertwined with the community.270

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
See infra text accompanying note 270.
See Kevin W. Weigand, Climate Change Disclosure: Ensuring the Viability of
the Insurance Industry While Protecting the Investor, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
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269. Id. at 306–07.
270. See VALERO, 2017 SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 36 (2017),
https://www.valero.com/en-us/Documents/SRR/2017_Valero_SRR_Booklet_Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KNK7-Y7KA]; see also DTE ENERGY, 2016-2017 CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP REPORT 30 (2017), https://geg2a4cqgdz35lnem46az2tb-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/DTE_CCR_PDF_digital-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KHD-SVZY]; see also XCEL ENERGY, MANAGING CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 2 (accessed March 15, 2019), https://www.xcelenergy.com/company/
corporate_responsibility_report/managing_corporate_responsibility [https://perma.cc/
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Companies speak of their community engagement through volunteering,
charity, employment and education opportunities, and economic
development of surrounding communities.271 Exxon Mobil has addressed
its direct community engagement on environmental issues through
effective community wastewater solutions.272 Furthermore, the law
recognizes community stakeholders.273
In banking, Dodd-Frank requires enhanced regulatory oversight for
SIFIs, as their insolvency would cause societal harm.274 The communities
affected, low-income and vulnerable populations, and the greater working
public are recognized by the law.275 In securities law, the SEC recently
revised its mining disclosure regulations to include engagement and study
of the interests of agencies, non-governmental organizations,
communities, and other stakeholders as required items to be disclosed
under a pre-feasibility or feasibility study of a mining project.276 The SEC
defended its inclusion of these disclosure requirements, stating “[w]e
believe that the inclusion of . . . [these] risks . . . [is] necessary because
factors such as environmental regulatory compliance, the ability to obtain
necessary permits, and other legal challenges can directly impact the
economic viability of a mining project.”277

69SK-EADF]; see also NEXTERA ENERGY, MATERIALITY ASSESSMENT 3 (2019),
http://www.nexteraenergy.com/sustainability/gri-index/materiality-assessment.html
[https://perma.cc/A94F-4FAX]; see also NRG ENERGY, NRG SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
18,
20
(2017),
https://www.nrg.com/assets/documents/sustainability/2017-nrgsustainability-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX2N-ZDTJ]; see also EXXON MOBIL, 2016
CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 30 (2016), https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/
en/~/media/Global/Files/sustainability-report/publication/2016-CCR-full-digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5VF-WMHG].
271. Id.
272. Exxon’s role in addressing the water challenge, EXXON MOBIL (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/Energy-and-environment/Environmentalprotection/Sustainable-water-solutions/
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[https://perma.cc/2YYT-VNEM]; EXXON MOBIL, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 27
(2016),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/~/media/Global/Files/sustainabilityreport/publication/2016-CCR-full-digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5P2-PC7D].
273. See supra Part III.E.
274. See supra Part III.E.
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The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that boards of directors can
consider other stakeholder interests during takeover negotiations.278 Many
other states have corporate “stakeholder laws” that allow the
consideration of surrounding communities or society when making
business decisions.279 Some states, such as Wyoming, even mandate
societal consideration for the board in business decisions.280
4. Proposal: Fair Fund
This Note argues for an adoption of the use of the SEC’s fair funds
authority. The proposal uses this authority as a legal mechanism of
compensating climate change-related remediation, mitigation, and
cleanup efforts, with a focus on vulnerable groups. Much like DoddFrank’s SIFI liquidity requirement that essentially creates an internally
managed fund to safeguard from external harms or systemic failure, the
fair fund mechanism is an externally managed fund used to remedy
internal parties or stakeholders.281
This proposal instead seeks to use fair funds to remedy external
harms. As the SEC’s primary goal is to protect investors and safeguard
the public interest by ensuring that capital markets are “fair, orderly, and
efficient,” fair funds tailored for remedying the external, environmental
harm created by market activity help in achieving this goal.282
Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC to add civil fines paid in
enforcement actions to disgorgement funds, which are called “fair funds,”
and distribute funds to the victims of securities violations.283 The decision
to distribute these funds to investors is at the discretion of the SEC or,
upon the SEC’s motion, the court, in cases in which the SEC brings suit
against the defendant.284 At the time the SEC recommends a negotiated
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See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
See generally Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2019); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 302A.251(s) (West 2019); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2019); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 351.347(1) (West 2019); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-815(3) (2019); N.M. Stat. Ann. 5311-35(D) (Michie 2019); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (West 2019); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 180.0827 (West 2019).
280. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-830(e) (Michie 2019).
281. See supra Part III.C.
282. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the
Sec’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 339–44 (2015).
283. Id. at 333, 339.
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settlement or to initiate litigation, it must also consider whether to propose
the creation of a fair fund:285
The SEC’s ultimate decision to distribute collected funds depends
largely on two factors: whether there is an identifiable class of investor
victims who suffered an identifiable harm, and whether the amount of
money likely to be collected from the defendant is large enough to
justify a distribution given the number of potential victims.286

However, fair funds have also been subject to the circularity critique,
especially in cases that involve fraudulent disclosures by public
companies.287 In these cases, management overstates the company’s
performance, pushing up its stock price.288 However, unless the firm
issues new stock or trades in its own stock during the period of
overstatement, its gain from the misrepresentation is minimal.289 When
the firm is forced to pay the penalty, its current shareholders are then
forced to bear the costs of that penalty, even though many of those same
shareholders suffered losses from the fraud.290
Therefore, for large corporate securities fraud, the proposal suggests
fair fund distribution to externally harmed, vulnerable communities as a
better allocation of resources to remedy the harm. External distribution
would avoid stakeholders bearing the cost of securities fraud settlements
through costs to the corporation when they are an innocent party.291
Dispersal to mitigation, remediation, and cleanup efforts would serve to
create a net benefit to society, rather than a zero sum or net loss through
circular dispersal.292
Fair funds also allow dispersal to the government if the SEC
determines investors cannot be successfully or practically reimbursed.293
285.
286.
287.
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the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 139 (2011) (Recognizing that fair fund distributions
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Velikonja, supra note 284, at 375.
288. Velikonja, supra note 284, at 375.
289. Id.
290. See supra Part III.C.
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The majority of sums collected for fair funds since its adoption were
deposited in the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund for this reason.294 The
proposal would not get rid of the option to contribute to the U.S. Treasury,
as it is still a net gain and can be used in mitigation, remediation, and
clean-up efforts.295 However, the most direct benefit would be direct
application of the fair fund for these efforts to low-income, vulnerable
communities affected by climate change.296
5. Recommendation to Regulators and Prosecutors
As traditional securities remedies suffer from circularity, it is
important for prosecutors—both federal and state—to bring cases that
externalize remedies.297 Externalized remedies can be general or
specific.298 General externalized remedies take the form of disgorged or
sanctioned payments to the federal or state government.299 In the fair fund
context, the SEC sends disgorged or sanctioned amounts—which cannot
be effectively allocated to investors—to the Treasury.300 Payments to the
government can be used to effectuate the remedying of external harms—
as in the climate change context—including mitigation, adaptation, and
cleanup efforts for vulnerable populations. The specific remedies in this
context take the form of payment directly to the EPA for remediation,
mitigation, and adaptation programs from the fair fund, as pursuant to this
proposal.
Therefore, the proposal recommends a larger, “public class counsel”
role for the SEC and state prosecutors to take on this type of fraud.301 This
public class counsel role increases an agency’s focus on remedying public
harms through seeking litigation that recoups harm caused and best deters
the conduct.302 In many instances, the SEC and other enforcement

294. Sonia A. Steinway, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What Do
They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J.
209, 210–12 (2014).
295. See supra Part IV.C.
296. See supra Part IV.C.
297. See supra Part II.C.
298. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured
Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2008).
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301. Id. at 1107.
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agencies already choose cases seeking deterrent effects.303 Yet, in terms
of the SEC, the agency has been reluctant to use the fair funds provision
to its full potential as a targeted remedial device, choosing instead to
recoup money directly to the U.S. Treasury.304 Nevertheless, by bringing
cases that seek external remedies, whether through the fair funds device
or through sanctions paid to the government, the securities laws can be an
effective remedial and deterrence mechanism of climate change-related
fraud.
CONCLUSION
Circularity in remedy, lack of mandatory disclosure, and the
challenge of quantifying proxy cost render using securities fraud an
ineffective mechanism to combat climate change. In order to effectuate
more transparent markets and a carbon accountable society, this Note
proposes a regulatory solution.
The proposal is modeled from Dodd-Frank as a stakeholder, and
externally focused law. The proposal has three mechanisms: enhanced
disclosure, GHG emissions reduction, and fair funds. The first two
mechanisms will provide the markets with more accurate and
comprehensive data, thereby resulting in more efficient markets. The
mechanisms working together also serve to deter fraudulent conduct
through litigation risk. The last mechanism, fair funds, serves to capture
the external harm left uncaptured by traditional remedies through
dispersal to vulnerable communities most affected by climate change.

303.
304.

Id. at 1110.
See SEC, FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 26, 33 n.1 (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9L7TMTN] (describing this statutory provision); see Steinway, supra note 298, at 210–11.

